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IN THE WAKE OF GRATZ V. BOLLINGER:
STANDING ON THIN ICE
ZUBAIDA QAZI*

Recently, in a display of remarkable inconsistency, the Supreme Court held that a transfer student had standing to challenge the constitutionality of a university's freshman admissions
policies. In Gratz v. Bollinger,' the Supreme Court upheld the
standing of a white transfer student to challenge the University of
Michigan's affirmative action policies as applied to its freshman
admissions program under the Equal Protection Clause' of the
Constitution.3 This decision further muddies the already murky
waters of the Article III standing requirement when applied to
equal protection cases.
This Comment examines the standing doctrine as found in
equal protection cases. Part I traces the birth and evolution of the
standing doctrine by looking at the Constitution and relevant case
law. Part I also explains the development of the constitutional
elements of injury-in-fact, causation and redressability as they
have emerged in case law. Part II analyzes the Supreme Court's
treatment of the Article III standing requirement in equal protection cases. Part II also examines key affirmative action cases leading up to the Court's holding in the Gratz opinion. Part II further
examines the Gratz opinion and concludes that the Court erred in
finding that the plaintiff had standing. Part III argues that the
less restrictive approach to standing adopted by the federal courts
to facilitate equal protection challenges brought by non-minority
plaintiffs against affirmative action programs does not truly serve
the best interests of those plaintiffs. Part III further suggests a
return to the classical interpretation of standing in equal protection cases. It further suggests that if the Court is unwilling to apply the classical standing requirements, it should expressly hold
* J.D., May 2005; B.A., University of Chicago, 1994. The author wishes
to thank her family and friends for their tireless support and patience, and the
editors and members of The John Marshall Law Review for their hard work.
The author is grateful to Professor Susan Connor for introducing her to this
topic and for her invaluable comments and advice.
1. 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The relevant portion of the amendment
reads: "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall.., deny to any
person... the equal protection of the laws." Id.
3. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 268.
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that the relaxed standing requirement will apply to all equal protection challenges.
I. BACKGROUND

A. Article III: "Cases"and "Controversies"
Since Chief Justice John Marshall wrote in 1803 that "[i]t is
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to
say what the law is,"' various doctrines have arisen to outline the
boundaries for such a judicial determination.5 Article III of the
Constitution defines the reach of the federal judiciary by limiting
jurisdiction to "cases" and "controversies.'
From these two
words,' the concept of justiciability has developed to define and
sharpen the bounds of federal jurisdiction.8
Justiciability significantly limits the suits that federal courts
may hear. A federal court cannot, for example, pronounce void
any statute, unless the pronouncement results from the court's
judgment of the "legal rights of litigants in actual controversies."9
The case-and-controversy doctrine, therefore, precludes advisory
opinions" and decisions on political questions." However, the doc4. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
5. Louis FISHER, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 97 (2d ed. 1995).
These doctrines include justiciability, standing, mootness, ripeness, political
questions and prudential considerations. Id.
6. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. The "cases" and "controversies" requirement is set forth in the following constitutional language: "The judicial Power
shall extend to all Cases,... [and] to Controversies .... " Id. See also Simon
v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 37 (1976) ("No principle is more
fundamental to the judiciary's proper role in our system of government than
the constitutional limitation of federal-court jurisdiction to actual cases or controversies.").
7. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94-95 (1968) (portraying cases and controversies as having an "iceberg quality, containing beneath their surface simplicity submerged complexities").
8. Id. at 95 (explaining that justiciability is the embodiment of the dual
limitation placed upon federal courts by the case-and-controversy doctrine: the
requirement of adverseness of questions presented, capable of resolution
through the judicial process, and the principle of separation of powers). See
also id. (describing justiciability as "a concept of uncertain meaning and
scope"); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 508 (1961) (painting the legal concept of
justiciability as having no "fixed content" nor "susceptible of scientific verification" with its utilization "the resultant of many subtle pressures").
9. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962) (quoting Liverpool Steamship
Co. v. Comm'rs of Emigration, 113 U.S. 33, 39 (1885)).
10. Flast, 392 U.S. at 96. The edict against advisory opinions arises from
events in the early 1790's whereupon authorization by Congress, a suit was
brought to determine the constitutionality of a statute. FISHER, supra note 5,
at 100. The suit did not create a case or controversy between adverse parties.
Id. In 1793, the Secretary of State asked the Justices of the Supreme Court if
"their advice to the executive would be available in the solution of important
questions of the construction of treaties, laws of nations and laws of the land".
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trine does allow for declaratory judgments. 2 At a minimum, federal judiciary power is limited to questions that are "real
and sub3
stantial," not hypothetical, abstract, academic or moot.
Justiciability encompasses various other doctrines designed to
further delineate the jurisdiction of the federal courts.' Among
these are standing, ripeness, mootness and political question." Of
these four principles, the doctrine of standing determines whether
a "real and substantial" controversy exists."

Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 354 (1911). Chief Justice Jay replied
to President Washington that the system of checks and balances in the Constitution and the Supreme Court being a last resort were strong arguments
against the Justices giving advisory opinions to the President. Id. To view a
copy of the original letter sent to President Washington by Justice John Jay,
see Letter from John Jay to George Washington (Aug. 8, 1793), http'/
www.columbia.edu/cgi-bin/cul/jaypapers/jp?mode=item&key=columbia.jay.084
44 (last visited Jan. 30, 2005) (discussing arguments against giving advisory
opinions to the President). See also FISHER, supra note 5, at 100-01 (discussing ways in which the Supreme Court still manages to give advisory opinions
to the Executive).
11. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 217 (viewing political questions as "essentially a
function of the separation of powers"). Baker explained the reasons that political questions are unjusticiable when it said:
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question
is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of
deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for
nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate
branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on
one question.
Id.
12. The Declaratory Judgments Act expressly allows declarations, stating:
In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction,... any court of
the United States... may declare the rights and other legal relations of
any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought. Any such declaration shall have the force and
effect of a final judgment or decree ....
Declaratory Judgments Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (2000).
13. Poe, 367 U.S. at 510.
14. Erwin Chemerinsky, Decision-Makers: In Defense of Courts, 71 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 109, 116-17 (1997).
15. Id.
16. See 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 313 (3d ed.

2000) (summarizing the role of standing as "an examination of the sufficiency
of the stake of the person making the claim, to ensure the litigant has suffered
an actual injury which is fairly traceable to challenged action and likely to be
redressed by the judicial relief requested").
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B. The StandingDoctrine:A BriefHistory
1.

"LegalInterest" Test

The focus on standing "as a distinct body of constitutional law
is an extraordinarily recent phenomenon." 7 In 1992, Professor
Sunstein noted that of all the times that the Supreme Court discussed standing in terms of Article III, nearly all occurred after
1965, and almost half occurred after 1985.18 He further noted that
the terms "standing" and "injury-in-fact" did not appear in case
law until after 1970.19
In the early part of the twentieth century, the right to sue existed only when the plaintiff could show the invasion of a "legal
right" conferred by Congress or common law.' ° A plaintiff did not
have to demonstrate a personal stake or injury-in-fact.2' Consistent with these principles, the Supreme Court at that time denied
standing in the absence of a law that conferred a right to sue to
the plaintiff.2
2. Injury-in-Fact
In 1970, Ass'n of Data Processing Service Organizations v.
Camp" greatly narrowed the old Article III jurisprudence requirement of an infringement of a legal right. ' In Data Process17. Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, "Injuries," and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 169 (1992).
18. Id. at 169. Professor Sunstein surveyed Supreme Court opinions ending in 1992 and found that the Supreme Court discussed standing in terms of
Article III on 117 occasions. Id. Fifty-five of those discussion occurred after
1985, during a span of only seven years. Id. Seventy-one of those discussions,
nearly two-thirds, occurred after 1980, in the span of only a decade. Id. Of
the 117, 109 of the discussions, or over ninety percent, have occurred since
1965. Id.
19. Id. at 169, 180.
20. Id. at 170. The legal right could be "one of property, one arising out of
contract, one protected against tortious invasion, or one founded on a statute
which confers a privilege." Id. at 181.
21. Id. at 170. Professor Sunstein goes on to say that there is no direct evidence that the Framers intended personal stake or injury-in-fact to be constitutional prerequisites under Article III. Id. at 173. See also id. at 166-67 (arguing that injury-in-fact has no support in the text or history of Article III and
is essentially an invention of federal judges, and recent ones at that). "[Tihe
very notion of 'injury-in-fact' is not merely a misinterpretation of the Administrative Procedure Act and Article III but also a large-scale conceptual mistake." Id. at 167. No court referred to "injury-in-fact" until 1970, and the
phrase has played no role in administrative or constitutional law since that
time. Id. at 169-70.
22. Id. at 180.
23. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
24. Tunde I. Ogowewo, Wrecking the Law: How Article III of the Constitution of the United States Led to the Discovery of a Law of Standing to Sue in
Nigeria, 26 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 527, 553 (2000) (noting Data Processing). See
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ing, the Supreme Court adopted the injury-in-fact test.25 This concept shifted the focus of standing analysis from the requisite "injury to a legally protected interest" to "objective, concrete harm."26
This trend towards broadening the injury-in-fact requirement continued until the mid-1970s, culminating in the Supreme Court's
decision in United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory
Agency Procedures("SCRAP").27
In SCRAP, an environmental group brought suit to challenge
the Interstate Commerce Commission's surcharge on railroad
freight rates, claiming by an attenuated line of reasoning that the
surcharge would result in an increased use of non-recyclable
goods.28 This, in turn, would divert natural resources out of the
Washington area and into the manufacturing process, which
would cause more litter everywhere, including Washington.29 The
Court found that the group had pleaded specific and perceptible
harm
sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss for lack of stand30
ing.
With the decision in SCRAP criticized as going to "the very
outer limit of the law,"' the Supreme Court responded to the new
recognition of "intangible, subjective, shared, or legally related injuries" with attempts to contract the now engorged injury-in-fact
standard.32 In 1975, the Supreme Court once again restricted the
also Eric J. Kuhn, Standing:Stood up at the Courthouse Door, 63 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 886, 887 (1996) (stating that prior to 1970, the Supreme Court employed the "legal interest" test, whereby the Court would deny standing to any
plaintiff who could not show "an invasion of a common law or statutory right,
such as an economic harm or bodily injury").
25. 397 U.S. at 152. In Data Processing,petitioners sought to challenge a
ruling permitting national banks to make certain services available to other
banks and bank customers. Id. at 151. The district court dismissed the complaint finding that the petitioners lacked standing. Id. The Supreme Court
reversed, finding that the petitioners had standing because they could demonstrate economic harm. Id. at 152-53. In its decision, the Court introduced the
"zone of interests" principle, finding that the petitioners' complaint fell within
the zone of interests of the challenged statute. Id. at 157. See also Sunstein,
supra note 17, at 186 (stating that Davis first mentioned injury-in-fact in his
treatise, misreading the Administrative Procedure Act and inadvertently
renovating standing law).
26. Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Rethinking Standing, 72 CAL. L. REV. 68, 74 (1984).
27. 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
28. Id. at 688.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 159 (1990). See also Lujan v.
Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 889 (1992) (characterizing the SCRAP decision as an expansive view that "has never since been emulated by [the Supreme] Court"). Indicating that the Court may rule differently upon reconsideration of the case, Professor Tribe believes that SCRAP will never be
overruled, because "it has largely become a dead letter." TRIBE, supra note 16,
at 414.
32. Nichol, supra note 26, at 75.
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requirement to challenge a governmental action by requiring a
"distinct and palpable injury."3 3 In subsequent cases, the Court
looked for a showing of a direct, particular harm, ' rather than one
which is "conjectural" or "hypothetical."3 5 Because injury-in-fact
has been difficult to define, the Supreme Court often makes caseby-case determinations of whether a plaintiff has made a sufficient
showing of injury-in-fact.3 6
3. Redressability
The element of redressability37 goes hand-in-hand with injuryin-fact to establish standing.' Over the years, the Supreme Court
has fluctuated widely in its treatment of this standing requirement. 39 In 1976, the Court required that a plaintiff must show
33. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975). The Supreme Court did not
preclude suits which might address grievances of the public at large:
But so long as this requirement is satisfied, persons to whom Congress
has granted a right of action, either expressly or by clear implication,
may have standing to seek relief on the basis of the legal rights and interests of others, and, indeed, may invoke the general public interest in
support of their claim.
Id. See also Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 155 (stating that the injury "must be concrete in both a qualitative and temporal sense").
34. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church &
State, 454 U.S. 464, 485-86 (1982). In Valley Forge, an organization challenged the conveyance of property by the federal government to a religiously
affiliated college based on the First Amendment. Id. at 467-69. The Supreme
Court found that the organization was no more adversely affected by the conveyance than any other citizen and could not show any personal injury, and
therefore did not have standing to file the suit. Id. at 485-86.
35. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101-02 (1983). In Lyons, the
plaintiff was subjected to a chokehold by the police department and suffered
physical injury. Id. at 97-98. The plaintiff sought an injunction to prevent the
police from administering chokeholds in the future. Id. at 102-03. The Supreme Court found that the plaintiff had no standing to seek an injunction because his allegation of past misconduct by the police did not prove that the
misconduct would continue. Id. at 106.
36. See TRIBE, supra note 16, at 400 (acknowledging that "no general definition of the requirement is truly satisfactory"). The Supreme Court has acknowledged that an understanding of the requirement can come about "only
through immersion in the various cases raising questions of injury-in-fact."

Id.
37. Although Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife sets out three elements of the
standing doctrine, namely injury-in-fact, causation and redressability, 504
U.S. 555, 560-62 (1992), Professor Spann explains that causation and redressability "are best understood as dual aspects of a single concern." Girardeau A.
Spann, Color-Coded Standing, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1422, 1429 (1995). He
goes on to state that, "[i]f an injury is proximately caused by the allegedly
unlawful action being challenged, then a judicial remedy will redress that injury, thereby ensuring that the courts are not impermissibly interfering with
the political process by issuing advisory dicta." Id.
38. TRIBE, supra note 16, at 424.
39. See Nichol, supra note 26, at 102 n.27 (exemplifying the inconsistent
manner in which the Court has treated redressability in a number of cases).
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that redressability would likely result, 4 whereas only a year earlier, the Court had ruled that a plaintiff had to show that redressability would result. ' Regardless of the Court's approach, however, the basic requirement has remained that a plaintiff
"personally would benefit in a tangible way from the court's intervention." 2
At its heart, redressability mandates that a plaintiff must
show that if the court found in his favor, the result would be the
relief that he sought.' If a favorable judgment would not redress
plaintiffs injury, standing would be lacking." Absent a showing of
redressability by a plaintiff, "exercise of its power by a federal
court would be gratuitous and thus inconsistent with the Article
III limitation."" Redressability, therefore, ensures the presence of
both personal stake and adverseness in a matter, which in turn
keeps the federal judiciary within its constitutional role.'
Traditionally, the Court treated causation and redressability
as two sides of the same coin. 47 It is telling that the definitive constitutional law treatise treats both causation and redressability in
a single section." In some cases, however, the Supreme Court has
stated that the distinction between causation and redressability is
crucial to a fair analysis of the issues." Therefore, just as failure
40. See Simon, 426 U.S. at 38 (requiring that plaintiff show an injury to
himself "likely to be redressed by a favorable decision").
41. See Warth, 422 U.S. at 505 (listing as an Article III minimum require-

ment a showing that "prospective relief will remove the harm").
42. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 104 n.5 (1998)
(quoting Warth, 422 U.S. at 508).
43. See Cynthia L. Fountaine, Article III and the Adequate and Independent
State Grounds Doctrine, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 1053, 1080 (1999) (emphasizing

that redressability requires that a favorable court decision will produce some
change or have an impact on the outcome of the case).
44. The Court in Simon found that there was not a substantial likelihood
that a favorable court decision would redress the plaintiffs' injury, and absent
such a showing, standing could not be granted. Simon, 426 U.S. at 45-46. In
Allen v. Wright, the Supreme Court came to a similar finding that the chances
of plaintiffs' children being educated in a racially integrated school as a result
of the Court's ruling was doubtful. 468 U.S. 737, 740 (1984). The Court added
that it was highly speculative whether the school would actually become less
segregated as a result of the Court's ruling. Id.
45. Simon, 426 U.S. at 38.
46. Fountaine, supra note 43, at 1064 (noting that the Court will also be
protected from issuing advisory opinions as a consequence).
47. Allen, 468 U.S. at 753 n.19. The Allen decision points out the difference
between causation and redressability, in that "the former examines the causal
connection between the assertedly unlawful conduct and the alleged injury,
whereas the latter examines the causal connection between the alleged injury
and the judicial relief requested." Id.
48. See TRIBE, supra note 16, at 424-33 (discussing the concepts of causa-

tion and redressability in the same section).
49. Allen, 468 U.S. at 753 n.19. Cases such as Allen, in which the relief requested goes well beyond the violation of law alleged, illustrate why it is im-
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to show redressability can lead to lack of standing, failure to establish a connection between the plaintiffs injury and an act committhe defendant can similarly demonstrate a lack of standted by
°
ing.

4. Separationof Powers
Another important facet of any discussion of justiciability is a
separation of powers analysis." This analysis was first injected
into the standing doctrine in Allen v. Wright in 1984.52 This decision made a significant conceptual impact upon the standing
analysis, as Professor Nichols explains:
Without explanation, and unsupported by two decades of decisions
and commentary, the Allen Court has ruled that the requirements of
standing are to be interpreted primarily by reference to "separation
of powers principles." At the very least, Allen has introduced a new
factor into the already complex standing calculus. At most, Allen
may portend a major tightening of judicial access by the Supreme
Court in the name of deference to other branches of government.'
Although prior cases discussed separation of powers principles vis-a-vis the standing requirements, Allen was the first case
to "explicitly suggest[] that separation of powers principles be used
to interpret or give meaning to the injury, causation, and redressportant to keep the inquiries separate if the "redressability" component is to
focus on the requested relief. Id.
50. Simon, 426 U.S. at 41-42. The plaintiffs in Simon challenged an IRS
ruling that allowed certain hospitals to limit services to indigents. Id. at 33.
The Court found that the plaintiffs could not show that the IRS ruling alone
kept the hospital from serving indigents. Id. at 42. It suggested the hospital
could very well decide on its own that it would limit services to indigents. Id.
at 42-43. Consequently, the plaintiffs failed to show a causal connection between the IRS ruling and limited service to indigents. Id. at 42-44. In Allen,
the plaintiffs were black parents who challenged the IRS' decision not to deny
tax-exempt status to certain discriminatory private schools and alleged that
the denial resulted in their children being unable to attend desegregated
schools. Allen, 486 U.S. at 739. The Court found that the causal relationship
between the IRS' refusal to deny tax-exempt status and the plaintiffs' children
being unable to receive education in a racially integrated school was too weak.
Id. at 740. Consequently, the Court denied standing to the plaintiffs. Id.
51. Separation of powers as it pertains to the standing doctrine ensures the
judiciary does not unconstitutionally infringe on the duties of the legislative
and executive branches. David A. Logan, Standing to Sue: A Proposed Separation of Powers Analysis, 1984 WIs. L. REV. 37, 47-48 (1984). See generally Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881 (1983) (arguing for the examination

of standing issues based on a separation of powers analysis).
52. 468 U.S. 737, 761 n.26 (disagreeing with the suggestions of the dissent
"that separation of powers principles merely underlie standing requirements,
have no role to play in giving meaning to those requirements, and should be
considered only under a distinct justiciability analysis").
53. Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Abusing Standing:A Comment on Allen v. Wright,

133 U. PA. L. REV. 635, 636 (1985) (defining Allen as a watershed decision).
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ability requirements of the standing determination ... [and]
bring[] separation of powers analysis out of the prudential realm
and squarely into the article III constitutional inquiry.""
C. The StandingDoctrine: Today
Despite all the changes that standing law has undergone, the
fundamental principle of "personal stake" has remained constant.5
To use the oft-quoted language of Baker v. Carr, the question of
standing asks "have the appellants alleged such a personal stake
in the outcome of the controversy ..."' By requiring personal
stake as a prerequisite to justiciability, standing has essentially
played the role of gatekeeper for federal courts determining the
likelihood that a court will hear a certain matter.57
Although riddled with confusion,' standing persists as a
mandatory and threshold condition of the constitutional case-andcontroversy requirement.59 It differs from all other elements of
justiciability in that it focuses primarily on the party rather than
on the substantive or underlying issues.' Although Congress may
confer standing upon citizens by statute,6 the Article III standing
requirements must still be satisfied."2 From a line of decisions,
54. See id. at 659 n.8 (defining Allen as a watershed decision).
55. Baker, 369 U.S. at 186, 204.
56. Id. at 204 (emphasis added).
57. See Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 475-76 (stating that "[those who do not
possess Art. III standing may not litigate as suitors in the courts of the United
States").
58. See, e.g., id. at 475 (stating that the Court "need not mince words when
[it] say[s] that the concept of 'Art. III standing' has not been defined with complete consistency"); Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 151 (stating that
"[gleneralizations about standing to sue are largely worthless as such"); Sue
Anna Moss Cellini, The Proposed Victims' Rights Amendment to the Constitution of the United States: Opening the Door of the Criminal Justice System to
the Victim, 14 ARiz. J. INT'L & COMp. L. 839, 857 (1997) (stating that "the
standing doctrine has developed a reputation for ambiguity and complexity
that is virtually unrivaled among modern legal concepts"); Nichol, supra note
53, at 650 (finding standing law unsatisfactory such that "[ainnounced principles do not explain even the major cases").
59. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61 (holding standing to be an "irreducible
constitutional minimum").
60. Flast, 392 U.S. at 99. "[When] standing is placed in issue in a case, the
question is whether the person whose standing is challenged is a proper party
to request an adjudication of a particular issue and not whether the issue itself is justiciable." Id. at 99-100.
61. Warth, 422 U.S. at 501 (recognizing that "Congress may grant an express right of action to persons who otherwise would be barred by prudential
standing rules").
62. See id. at 501 (emphasizing that even with a statutory grant of standing, the Article III requirement remains: "the plaintiff still must allege a distinct and palpable injury to himself, even if it is an injury shared by a large
class of other possible litigants"). See also Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 820
n.3 (1997) (stating that "[iut is settled that Congress cannot erase Article III's
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three constitutional elements of standing have emerged.' First,
the plaintiff must allege an "injury-in-fact."' Second, the injury
must be "fairly traceable" to an act of the defendant.' Third, the
plaintiff must show that the injury is one that can be "redressed by
a favorable decision."
Along with the constitutional requirements of standing, the
courts established certain prudential principles that limit a party's
ability to seek relief on a matter." These include situations in
which plaintiffs: present issues which are "generalized grievances";' assert the rights or interests of third parties instead of
their own; 69 or do not present a claim which falls within the "zone
of interest" to be protected by the statute or constitutional guarantee.70
II. STANDING DOCTRINE IN EQUAL PROTECTION CASES: "SEPARATE
BUT EQUAL" STANDING REQUIREMENTS

In the past fifty years, starting with Brown v. Board of Education,7 the Fourteenth Amendment72 has been a powerful tool
used to address and remedy discriminatory practices in society.7
standing requirements by statutorily granting the right to sue to a plaintiff
who would not otherwise have standing"). See generally Sunstein, supra note
17, at 202-15 (discussing how Lujan radically curbed the Congressional power
to confer standing). Professor Sunstein remarks that Lujan "ranks among the
most important [decisions] in history in terms of the sheer number of federal
statutes that it apparently has invalidated." Id. at 165. See also Lujan, 504
U.S. at 561-66 (placing constraints on congressionally conferred as well as judicially conferred standing).
63. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 472.
64. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. Specifically, a plaintiff must show "an invasion
of a legally protected interest" which is particularized and "actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical." Id. (quoting Lyons, 461 U.S. at 102) (internal quotations omitted).
65. Id. The injury must be "fairly... trace[ablel to the challenged action of
the defendant, and not.., the result [of] the independent action of some third
party not before the court." Id. (quoting Simon, 426 U.S. at 41-42).
66. Id. at 561 (quoting Simon, 426 U.S. at 38, 43).
67. These prudential principles can be used to deny standing even when the
constitutional requirements are satisfied. Gladstone, Realtors v. Bellwood,
441 U.S. 91, 99 (1979). The Court explains that these principles are the
means "by which the judiciary seeks to avoid deciding questions of broad social
import where no individual rights would be vindicated and to limit access to
the federal courts to those litigants best suited to assert a particular claim."
Id. at 99-100.
68. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 475 (citing Warth, 422 U.S. at 499).
69. Id. at 474 (citing Warth, 422 U.S. at 499-500).
70. Id. at 475(quoting Data Processing,397 U.S. at 153).
71. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
72. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
73. See Brian R. Markley, Comment, ConstitutionalProvisions in Conflict:
Article III Standing and Equal Protection after Shaw v. Reno, 43 KAN. L. REV.
449, 449 (1995) (noting the development of equal protection doctrine as a re-
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Affirmative action programs emerged as one answer to remedy
harms against minorities and promote racial diversity. 4 One result of these programs has been an outcrop of "reverse discrimination" suits by non-minorities challenging these programs based on
violations of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 6 In 1989, the Supreme Court mandated that courts
apply strict scrutiny to affirmative action programs." As a result,
"the issue of standing has become highly important because it is
the vehicle through which the courts can expand or limit the number of nonminority plaintiffs who may challenge affirmative action
programs."77
A. StandingRequirements in Equal ProtectionCases
1.

Regents of University of California v. Bakke
The first case in which the Court applied the Equal Protection
Clause to an affirmative action challenge was Regents of the University of California v. Bakke.'6 In this case, the Supreme Court
held that an affirmative action program at the University of California Medical School was unlawful.79
In Bakke, the University of California Davis Medical School
rejected the application of the plaintiff, Bakke, a white male."0
Bakke brought suit against the University, claiming that the
school's admissions scheme violated the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment."' The California Supreme Court,
finding that Bakke had proved that the University had discriminated against him based on his race, directed the trial court to enter judgment ordering Bakke's admission to the medical school.'
The Supreme Court affirmed the holding that the special admissions program was unlawful.'
The Court limited its discussion of standing in the decision to
a footnote, finding that the fact that Bakke was not allowed to
compete for all of the seats available for the entering class of medisponse to discriminatory governmental policies).
74. David J. Antczak, Bras v. California Public Utilities Commission: Using
"Economic Realities" to Establish Standing and Challenge "Goal'-Based Affirmative Action, 41 VILL. L. REV. 1445, 1446 (1996).
75. Id. at 1448.
76. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493-94 (1989).
77. Antczak, supra note 74, at 1451.
78. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
79. Id. at 320.
80. Id. at 276.
81. Id. at 277-78.
82. Id. at 280-81.
83. Id. at 271-72.

The Court affirmed that portion of the ruling that or-

dered Bakke's admission and held the admissions program invalid, but reversed insofar as the ruling prohibited the University from taking race into

consideration in its admission decisions. Id.
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cal school was sufficient to confer standing upon him. 4 The Court
did not look beyond those facts to determine whether Bakke would
have been accepted to the medical school but for the affirmative
action program in place.' In effect, the Court ignored the standing
requirements which would require a showing that a favorable ruling would result in Bakke's admission to the medical school because he was a qualified applicant.
2. Northeastern Florida Chapter of the Associated General
Contractors of America v. City of Jacksonville
The most notable 180-degree turn in standing came in the
Court's decision in Northeastern Florida Chapterof the Associated
General Contractors of America v. City of Jacksonville." In this
case, the Supreme Court upheld the standing of non-minority construction contractors to challenge a minority set-aside program
under the Equal Protection Clause."
In Northeastern, the plaintiff was an association comprised of
individuals and firms in the Jacksonville, Florida construction industry.' Plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of a municipal
law that set aside ten percent of the construction funds for minority contractors."9 The Eleventh Circuit found that the plaintiff
lacked an injury-in-fact because it had failed to demonstrate that
even one of its members would have received a city contract but for
the city ordinance. 0 The Supreme Court overturned the decision
finding that the plaintiffs had standing to challenge the ordi91
nance.
In Northeastern, the Court reviewed its prior equal protection
decisions92 and held that the injury-in-fact requirement compelled
84. Id. at 280-81 n.14. The Court specifically states that:
[Elven if Bakke had been unable to prove that he would have been ad-

mitted in the absence of the special program, it would not follow that he
lacked standing. The constitutional element of standing is plaintiffs
demonstration of any injury to himself that is likely to be redressed by
favorable decision of his claim. The trial court found such an injury,
apart from failure to be admitted, in the University's decision not to
permit Bakke to compete for all 100 places in the class, simply because

of his race. Hence the constitutional requirements of Art. III were met.
Id. (citations omitted).
85. See Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Standing for Privilege: The Failure of Injury
Analysis, 82 B.U. L. REV. 301, 311 (2002) (indicating the Court's failure to find

out if Bakke was even qualified to compete).
86. 508 U.S. 656 (1993).
87. Id. at 669.
88. Id. at 659.
89. Id. at 658-59.
90. Id. at 660.
91. Id. at 658.
92. See id. at 663-66 (reviewing equal protection cases addressing injury-infact). See also Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957, 962 (1982) (granting plain-

tiff standing to challenge requirement that directs state officeholders to resign
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only a showing of intent on the part of the plaintiff.' Despite its
previous record of setting a high standard for standing, the Court
now relaxed its stance on requirements to establish standing,
making it easier for parties to seek relief for violations of the
Equal Protection Clause.'
3.

Gratz v. Bollinger

The most recent Supreme Court decision applying the relaxed
standing requirements established in Bakke and Northeastern is
Gratz v. Bollinger. In this case, the Supreme Court upheld the
standing of a white transfer student to challenge the University of
Michigan's affirmative action policies as applied to its freshman
admissions program under the Equal Protection Clause.95
a.

Facts and Prior History

Petitioners Jennifer Gratz and Patrick Hamacher, both Caucasian, applied for undergraduate admission to the University of
Michigan ("University").' In October 1997, following the denial of
from current office when candidacy for other offices is announced, even though
plaintiff did not allege that plaintiff would have been elected "but for" requirement); Bakke, 438 U.S. at 280-81 n.14 (finding standing for white medical school applicant to challenge school policy of reserving seats in class for
minority applicants, in absence of allegation that plaintiff would have been
admitted to school but for race-conscious policy); Warth, 422 U.S. at 516 (denying standing to organization challenging town zoning ordinance that effectively excluded low and moderate income persons because organization did not
refer to any specific project of its members that was precluded by ordinance);
Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 362 n.23 (1970) (concluding that plaintiff had
standing to challenge law that limited school board membership to property
owners, even though plaintiff never averred that plaintiff would have been appointed to board in the absence of the limitation).
93. Northeastern, 508 U.S. at 666. The Court explained the manner in
which the injury-in-fact requirement would be satisfied, stating:
When the government erects a barrier that makes it more difficult for
members of one group to obtain a benefit than it is for members of another group, a member of the former group seeking to challenge the barrier need not allege that he would have obtained the benefit but for the
barrier in order to establish standing. The "injury-in-fact" in an equal
protection case of this variety is the denial of equal treatment resulting
from the imposition of the barrier, not the ultimate inability to obtain
the benefit.
Id.
94. Such a relaxed standing policy would expand judicial power. George P.
Choundas, Neither Equal Nor Protected: The Invisible Law of Equal Protection, the Legal Invisibility of Its Gender-Based Victims, 44 EMORY L.J. 1069,
1154 (1995). But see United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 188 (1974)
(Powell, J., concurring) (cautioning against an expanded judicial power in its
statement: "It seems to me inescapable that allowing unrestricted taxpayer or
citizen standing would significantly alter the allocation of power at the national level, with a shift away from a democratic form of government").
95. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 267-68.
96. Id. at 251. In Gratz, the petitioners applied to the University's College
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their applications by the University, Gratz and Hamacher filed a
class-action lawsuit' in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Michigan against the University" for violation
of the Fourteenth Amendment." Meanwhile, during the pendency
of the case, both Gratz and Hamacher enrolled at other schools
from which they graduated."u
At the outset, the District Court designated Hamacher the
class representative for the lawsuit. 1' In the liability phase of the
trial, ' the court granted in part the motions for summary judgment of both the petitioners and the University."° Both parties
of Literature, Science and the Arts ("LSA") as residents of the State of Michigan. Id.
97. Plaintiffs sought compensatory and punitive damages for past violations. Id. at 252. They further sought injunctive relief prohibiting the University from the continued use of its affirmative action admissions policy. Id.
Finally, Hamacher sought an order requiring the University to grant him admission as a transfer student. Id.
98. Petitioners filed their lawsuit against the University of Michigan, the
LSA, James Duderstadt and Lee Bollinger. Id. Subsequently, the University
and the LSA were replaced by the proper defendant, The University of Michigan Board of Regents. Id. at 252 n.2. Duderstadt, sued in his individual capacity, was the president of the University when Gratz's application was pending. Id. at 252 n.3. Bollinger, sued in both his individual and official
capacities, was the president of the University at the time Hamacher applied
for admission. Id.
99. Petitioners' complaint was a class-action suit alleging violations of their
rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution as well as racial
discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983 and 2000d. Id. at 252.
100. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 251. A final decision on Gratz's admission was delayed. Id. The University stated that Gratz was "well qualified," but "less
competitive" than the students who had been admitted. Id. Upon learning
that her admission had been denied, Gratz enrolled in the University of
Michigan at Dearborn from which she graduated in the spring of 1999. Id.
Hamacher's admission was also delayed and he was given the same reason as
the one given to Gratz by the University. Id. His application was denied and
he subsequently enrolled at Michigan State University. Id. He has since
graduated from Michigan State University. Id. at 251 n.1.
101. Id. at 253. The district court found that a class action was appropriate
in the case and granted class certification. Id. at 252. The certified class consisted of those who were denied admission to the University beginning in 1995
and who were members of racial groups not considered by the University in its
admissions policy. Id. at 252-53.
102. On petitioner's motion, the district court agreed to bifurcate the trial
into a liability and damages phase. Id. at 253. The first phase of the trial, the
liability phase, was to determine whether the University's admissions policy
violated the Equal Protection Clause. Id.
103. Id. at 259. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment with
respect to liability. Id. at 257. The court granted the petitioners' motion for
summary judgment for the years from 1995 to 1998, finding that the policy
operated as a quota and was therefore unconstitutional. Id. at 257 n.9. The
court also granted the University's motion for summary judgment for the
years 1999 and 2000, finding that the University's admissions policy was constitutional. Id.
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appealed to the Sixth Circuit and while the interlocutory appeals
were pending, the Sixth Circuit issued an opinion in Grutter v.
Bollinger, upholding the University's law school admissions policy."°' Even though the Sixth Circuit had not yet rendered an opinion in Gratz, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in both cases.'0 5
In Grutter and Gratz, the Court addressed the constitutionality of
the University's admissions policies that considered race as one
factor in determining admission."
b.

The Majority Opinion

Although no party had raised the issue on appeal, the Supreme Court Justices addressed the issue of standing." 7 The majority, led by Chief Justice Rehnquist, held that Hamacher had
standing, based on a personal stake in the outcome of the suit."°
The majority found that Hamacher's intent to apply as a transfer
student sufficiently countered Justice Stevens' contention' °9 that
Hamacher did not in fact establish himself as a transfer student
nor did he prove injury-in-fact.10° The majority also found that the
differences between the freshman and transfer admissions policies
were sufficiently similar to justify Hamacher as class representative for claims made as to the freshman admissions policy."' The
Court did admit, however, that its holding in this case was in tension with prior holdings on the issue."'
104. 288 F.3d 732, 735 (6th Cir. 2002).
105. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 259-60.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 260. Pursuant to the Article III case or controversy requirement,
when the Supreme Court reviews a decision of a federal district court, it is obligated to examine the standing of the parties even if the issue of standing is
not raised by the parties themselves. Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 331 (1977).
108. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 268. The Court held that Hamacher had standing
due to "[his] personal stake, in view of both his past injury and the potential
injury he faced at the time of certification" and that he could "maintain [a]
class-action challenge to the University's use of race in undergraduate admissions." Id.
109. See infra Part II.A.3.c (discussing Justice Stevens' dissent in Gratz, 539
U.S. at 282-90).
110. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 260-61.
111. Id. at 265. The Court found that "the same set of concerns [were] implicated by the University's use of race in evaluating all undergraduate admissions applications under the guidelines." Id. at 267.
112. Id. at 263 n.15 (noting that "there is tension in our prior cases in this
regard"). The Court cites two cases at odds with the current decision: Blum v.
Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982) and General Telephone Co. of the Southwest v.
Falcon, 457 U.S. 147 (1982). Gratz, 539 U.S. at 263 n.15. See Blum, 457 U.S.
at 1002 (finding that class representatives who had been transferred to lower
levels of medical care lacked standing to challenge transfers to higher levels of
care); General Telephone, 457 U.S. at 149, 158-59 (finding that a MexicanAmerican plaintiff alleging that he was passed over for a promotion because of
race was not an adequate representative to "maintain a class action on behalf
of Mexican-American applicants" who were not hired by the same employer).
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The Dissent

In his dissent, Justice Stevens argued that the Court should
dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction, because Hamacher lacked
standing to seek injunctive relief with respect to the University's
use of race in undergraduate admissions.113 He based his holding
on the fact that Hamacher had no personal stake in the suit."'
Justice Stevens focused on Hamacher's status as a transfer
applicant in seeking injunctive relief."' According to Justice Stevens, Hamacher's status failed to establish standing for three reasons." 6 First, Hamacher never actually applied as a transfer student, he only intended to do so." ' Second, the transfer policy was
not before the Court,"8 rather the Court was asked to provide injunctive relief regarding the freshman admissions policy."' Third,
the differences between the freshman and transfer student admissions policies were such that a modification of the freshman policy
would not likely have an impact on the transfer policy.' Because
Hamacher would have 2no personal stake in the relief he sought, he
did not have standing.' '
B. Relaxation of the ConstitutionalElements of Standing in
Challenges to Affirmative Action
Northeastern, Bakke and Gratz show a trend in the Court towards relaxing standing requirements in cases of Equal Protection
where affirmative action programs are challenged.
1.

Injury-in-FactRedefined

One way that the Court has overcome the standing hurdle in
2
Equal Protection cases is by redefining injury-in-fact.'1
For example, in Northeastern, Justice Thomas rejected the view that the
plaintiff must show an inability to obtain a specific benefit to satisfy the injury-in-fact element of standing.2 1 Instead of showing
an inability to obtain the benefit, the plaintiff needed only to show
21
a denial of equal treatment due to the imposition of a barrier.
"To establish standing, therefore," Justice Thomas wrote, "a party
challenging a set-aside program... need only demonstrate that it
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Gratz, 539 U.S. at 287 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 290 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 285 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 286 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 287 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
121. Id. at 289 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
122. See Antczak, supra note 74, at 1464 (noting Justice Thomas' adoption of

an "inability to compete" analysis of injury-in-fact).
123. Northeastern, 508 U.S. at 666.

124. Id.
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is able and ready to [perform] and that a discriminatory policy
prevents it from doing so on an equal basis."'25
This characterization of the injury-in-fact can have a significant impact on whether the elements of causation and redressability have been satisfied."' For example, in Bakke, by characterizing
the injury not as the University's failure to admit Bakke, but as a
loss of an opportunity to compete for the spots, the Court can find
that all three elements of standing-injury-in-fact, causation and
redressability-are satisfied. 127 This simple tweaking by the Court
can readily affect the standing of other cases as well:
In all of these cases of unequal treatment, both causation and redressability are readily satisfied, as an analytic matter, if one simply takes care to specify that the injury complained of is the harm of
being unjustifiably disadvantaged in comparison to others who are
similarly situated; it is not the harm of being denied the particular
exemption or other benefit that others enjoy.la
2. An IncreasinglyElusive RedressabilityRequirement
In Northeastern, Justice Thomas was careful to distinguish
as
Warth, because the Equal Protection standing requirements
1 29
result.
different
very
a
yield
would
Warth
to
applied
In Warth, petitioners challenged the respondents' zoning ordinance which "effectively excluded persons of low and moderate
income from living in the town."13 The Court found that the plaintiffs were unable to show redressability because they could not
prove that they would actually obtain housing if the ordinance in
question were invalidated. 1 If the plaintiffs in Warth had asserted that the unconstitutional zoning ordinance had deprived
them of the opportunity to compete in the housing market, they
would have been able to satisfy standing requirements as they appear in Northeastern.'
Viewing this dilemma from yet another angle, if the Court
125. Id. The Court goes on to distinguish Warth. Id. at 667-68.
126. Sunstein, supra note 17, at 203-05.
127. Id. at 203. See also Bakke, 438 U.S. at 318 (discussing how the qualifications of the applicant are weighed so that fair and equal treatment is maintained); TRIBE, supra note 16, at 431 (explaining how the recharacterization of

injury-in-fact can satisfy standing requirements).
128. TRIBE, supra note 16, at 434.
129. Northeastern, 508 U.S. at 667-68.

130. 422 U.S. at 493.
131. Id. at 504. In Warth, the Court held that:
Petitioners must allege facts from which it reasonably could be inferred
that, absent the respondents' restrictive zoning practices, there is a substantial probability that they would have been able to purchase or lease
in Penfield and that, if the court affords the relief requested, the as-

serted inability of petitioners will be removed.
Id.
132. Nichol, supra note 26, at 80.
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held that plaintiffs in Warth could redress their injuries only by
showing that they would actually obtain housing, the question
arises: Why did the Court not require Bakke to prove that he
would have gotten into medical school?"n Had the Court required
such a showing, Bakke might not have ended up in medical
school.1
3. Equal Protection Standing as Applied in Gratz
The decision in Gratz applied the Equal Protection standing
requirements to conclude that Hamacher had standing to bring
the suit." Justice Stevens objected to the majority's failure to
dismiss the case for lack of standing because he claimed that
Hamacher did not have a personal stake in the matter.'
The majority, in turn, used the Equal Protection standing requirements to address this issue. First, the Court found that
Hamacher did not need to show that he had applied as a transfer
student.'
Using the Northeastern rule, he needed only to show
that he was "able and ready" to transfer if the alleged discriminatory admissions practices did not exist. 34 The Court did not require Hamacher to prove that but for the admissions policy at issue, he would have been admitted to the school. 9
In fact,
Hamacher did not have to show anything; he only had to allege
that he intended to transfer to the University. "'
Using the same Equal Protection standing requirements, the
133. Id. at 81.

134. A number of Bakke-type cases exist but with very different results because plaintiffs had to show that they would have been admitted but-for the
affirmative action program operating at the school. See Doherty v. Rutgers

Sch. of Law-Newark, 651 F.2d 893, 902 (3d Cir. 1981) (finding that plaintiff
lacked standing to challenge the law school minority student admissions pro-

gram, where he had failed to qualify for admission even in the absence of the
special program due to his academic deficiencies); Donnelly v. Boston Coll.,

558 F.2d 634, 635 (1st Cir. 1977) (finding that plaintiff lacked standing to
bring an action challenging the law schools' affirmative action program where

the evidence clearly showed that the "plaintiff would not have been admitted
to any of the law schools even if no minority group members had been admitted"); Henson v. Univ. of Ark., 519 F.2d 576, 576-78 (8th Cir. 1975) (finding
that white female plaintiff lacked standing to challenge a law school's minority

admission policy, where she did not show by a preponderance of the evidence
that her failure to be admitted resulted from the program).
135. See Gratz, 539 U.S. at 260 (stating that the petitioners have standing
for their requested relief).

136. Id. at 290-91 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
137. Id. at 260-61.
138. Id. at 262.
139. Id. The district court rejected the assertion by the University that

Hamacher needed a 3.0 GPA in order to attempt to transfer, concluding that
"Hamacher's present grades are not a factor to be considered at this time." Id.
at 283 n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

140. Id. at 260-62.
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majority seemingly resolved the issue of lack of redressability by
finding that the transfer admissions policy and the freshman admissions policy were in fact identical."' The Court stated that "the
only difference" is that minority freshman applicants are given
twenty points while minority transfer applicants are not given
points. 2 This difference is significant but is ignored by the Court
as having no effect on Hamacher's standing."
Under the classical standing requirements, Hamacher would
not have found the courtroom doors open to his challenge.
Hamacher failed to show an injury-in-fact, or a concrete harm,
that would warrant injunctive relief. Further, Hamacher failed to
show that a favorable decision by the Court would grant him the
relief that he sought. He had already applied to another university and would therefore never apply to the University as a freshman again. The fact that the admissions policy at issue related
only to freshman applicants precluded Hamacher from relief as a
transfer student.
III. QUALITY, NOT QUANTITY
At the present time, the status of the law on standing is in
disarray.'" In equal protection cases, the Supreme Court has confounded the standing doctrine by significantly relaxing its basic
requirements."
These rulings fly in the face of long-standing
precedents, such as Warth." It is critical that the Supreme Court
clarify the issue of standing so that plaintiffs are able to look to a
consistent judicial policy when seeking relief by the Court.
The Supreme Court can resolve the conflict in the standing
141. Id. at 265. The Court found that "the criteria used to determine
whether a transfer applicant will contribute to the University's stated goal of
diversity are identicalto that used to evaluate freshman applicants." Id.

142. Id. at 266.
143. Id.
144. See supra note 58 and accompanying text (listing the criticisms against
the standing doctrine as it stands today).
145. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 281 n.14 (requiring only that plaintiff is ready
and able to perform and not that the plaintiff actually applied to the school);
Northeastern,508 U.S. at 666 (requiring only that plaintiff is ready and able to
perform and not that the plaintiff actually submitted a bid).
146. See Warth, 422 U.S. at 504 (finding that plaintiffs lacked standing
where they could not show that they would actually acquire housing if the zoning ordinance prohibiting low-income housing was repealed). See also Spann,

supra note 37, at 1431 (explaining that prior to the Northeasterndecision 'the
law of standing had become very strict"). A plaintiff had to satisfy the following elements to establish standing:
that the injury was proximately caused by the challenged conduct of the
defendant; that the injury was imminent; that the plaintiffs challenge
was not a programmatic challenge to a general government policy deci-

sion; and that the injury would be redressed by a favorable decision on
the merits.
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doctrine as found in equal protection cases by simply returning to
the classical definition of standing and by applying the Baker personal stake requirement in those cases. Although federal courts
would hear fewer equal protection challenges, the resulting case
law would go a long way towards removing the confusion in the
standing doctrine.
If the Court insists, however, in relaxing the classical standing requirements, it should then do expressly what it has done implicitly since Bakke: it should bifurcate the standing doctrine so
that in equal protection cases, injury-in-fact would require only
that the plaintiff is ready and able to perform, while in all other
cases, injury-in-fact would require an actual, concrete and imminent injury.
A. A Return to the Classical StandingDoctrine
Starting with Baker, the Supreme Court set forth a personal
stake requirement to establish standing in a suit. " 7 However, decisions by the Court, such as Northeastern and Bakke, have effectively turned their back on the personal stake requirement. This,
in turn, has made it easier for plaintiffs to challenge raceconscious methods employed by the government to ensure greater
representation of minorities in various public arenas, such as universities. "'
In these reverse discrimination cases, the Court has
dramatically manipulated the elements of the standing doctrine, "9
so that injury-in-fact requires only that a plaintiff show that he is
ready and able to perform. 5 ° The result is a relaxed standing requirement, which allows a greater number of equal protection
cases to reach the courts. 15
The classical standing doctrine requires that the plaintiffs
show an actual injury, fairly traceable to the defendant and redressable by a favorable decision."2 For example, in Warth, the
Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs did not have standing to
challenge a zoning ordinance which precluded lower income persons from residing in the town, because the plaintiffs did not dem147. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 204 (stating that "the gist of the question of
standing" is whether "the appellants [have] alleged such a personal stake in
the outcome of the controversy").
148. Nancy J. King, Racial Jurymandering: Cancer or Cure? A Contemporary Review of Affirmative Action in Jury Selection, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 707, 709
(1993).
149. Spann, supra note 37, at 1452 (noting that the Supreme Court now applies "its manipulable law of standing" to cases involving racial discrimination).
150. See King, supra note 148, at 709 and text accompanying note 148 (citing
Northeastern and Bakke which do not require a showing of actual injury to es-

tablish standing).
151. King, supra note 148, at 709.
152. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 472.
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onstrate an actual injury."n The Court did not consider whether
the plaintiffs were ready and able to move into town but required
an actual showing of their ability to obtain housing." This view of
standing continues to be relevant because the Court has failed to
overrule Warth, which remains a landmark decision in constitutional law.
In cases such as Northeastern and Bakke, however, the Court
has applied a very different version of the injury-in-fact requirement, requiring only a showing by the plaintiff that he is ready
and able to perform. 155 Northeastern attempted to distinguish
Warth," but far from clarifying the discrepancy in the Court's application of the standing doctrine to different cases, the Court,
perhaps inadvertently, in fact laid out a formula for the manipulation of the standing doctrine in order to attain standing with
greater ease in an equal protection challenge case."'
In Gratz, the Supreme Court had an opportunity to clarify the
discrepancy that has crept into the standing doctrine but failed to
do so. The dissent was correct in asserting that the Court should
have denied Hamacher standing to bring suit for failure to show
personal stake."
The Supreme Court, in holding as the dissent
did, could have clarified the standing doctrine by returning to the
classical standing analysis found in Warth.
Returning to the classical standing requirements in equal
protection cases will result in fewer affirmative action challenges
being heard by the courts."9 Far from being a detriment, however,
the result of this will be the strengthening of case law addressing
equal protection challenges. By focusing on the quality as opposed
M

153. 422 U.S. at 504.
154. Id.
155. See King, supra note 148, at 709 and text accompanying note 148 (citing

Northeastern and Bakke which do not require a showing of actual injury to establish standing). Professor Spann emphasizes that this change in the Supreme Court's application of the standing requirements "not only contributes
confusion to the law of standing, but also raises suspicions about the Supreme
Court's motivation." Spann, supra note 37, at 1427.
156. See Northeastern, 508 U.S. at 667-68 (distinguishing Warth). Justice

Thomas stated that in Warth, "there was no claim that the construction association's members could not apply for variances and building permits on the
same basis as other firms; what the association objected to were the 'refusals

by the town officials to grant variances and permits.'" Id. (quoting Warth, 422
U.S. at 515). See also Spann, supra note 37, at 1452 (noting that the Court

ignored standing requirements in granting standing in Northeastern and
'made little effort to distinguish the applicable precedents in doing so").
157. See TRIBE, supra note 16, at 431-32 (explaining how defining injury as
loss of opportunity allows for standing whereas defining injury as a failure to
acquire services would result in denial of standing).
158. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 290-91 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
159. But see generally Choundas, supra note 94 (arguing that the standing
requirements close the courtroom doors in the faces of plaintiffs bringing equal

protection challenges).
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to the quantity of the plaintiffs challenging affirmative action programs, the Court will establish clear precedents in its rulings.
Such a result can only be favorable.
When it revisits this issue in the future, the Court should affirm that the standing doctrine requires an actual injury and not
just a ready and able standard.
B. A Bifurcation of the Standing Doctrine
In the alternative, the Supreme Court could have used the
opportunity presented by Gratz to expressly establish a bifurcation
in the standing doctrine. In this way, the ready and able standard
applied in Northeastern, Bakke and Gratz would be the accepted
standing doctrine in cases of equal protection cases." ° Because
equal protection means to remedy discrimination,'' the Court
could have stated that a more relaxed standing doctrine is required for public policy reasons so that everyone may access the
Court.
The fact that simply recharacterizing an injury as an inability
to compete can grant sudden access to the courts is an exercise in
game playing." 2 The Court needs to clarify this so that plaintiffs
do not have to resort to verbal game playing in order to access the
courts. If the Court were to simply state that in affirmative action
cases, or in cases of equal protection, the standing standard would
simply be ready and able, then those who are denied standing,
such as the plaintiffs in Warth, could be granted access to the
courts. In Warth, had the plaintiffs simply stated that their injury
was their inability to compete in the housing market due to the
zoning ordinance, they would have had standing.
Such an express ruling by the Supreme Court would bring to
light allegations of discriminatory practices in rulings in equal
protection cases already made against the Court. Professor Spann
points out a long history of the Supreme Court's rulings that discriminate against minorities."n Even in equal protection chal160. See Gratz, 539 U.S. at 262 (applying the ready and able standard to establish standing). See also King, supra note 148, at 709 and text accompany-

ing note 148 (citing Northeastern and Bakke which require only that plaintiff
is ready and able to perform to establish standing).
161. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. But see Spann, supra note 37, at 1475
(stating that the intent of equal protection "had nothing whatsoever to do with
protecting the interests of the white majority"). "[Tihe intent of the drafters

was to provide federal protection.., to former black slaves who were being
victimized by the Black Codes of the post-Civil War South." Id. The drafters
did not intend to protect whites. Id.
162. See TRIBE, supra note 16, at 431-32 (showing how defining injury in a

different way can make the difference between a grant of standing and a denial of standing to bring suit).
163. Spann, supra note 37, at 1454.

Professor Spann delivers a scathing

analysis of the Court's role in perpetuating discrimination, stating:
As the final constitutional arbiter, the Court is the ideal governmental
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lenges, the Court has been quick to grant standing in reverse discrimination challenges such as those found in Bakke, Northeastern
and now Gratz."6 In cases of discrimination challenges by minorities, however, the Supreme Court has kept the standing requirement bar high. 66 If the Supreme Court is engaging in such practices, it should simply make its standard requirements express
instead of continuing to rule in such implicitly discriminatory
ways. 166
IV. CONCLUSION

Gratz was an opportunity missed by the Supreme Court to resolve the confusion in the standing doctrine, especially as it applies to equal protection cases. By ruling that a plaintiff need only
show that he is ready and able to perform, the Supreme Court allowed the personal stake requirement to become so relaxed that
the door is now open for nearly anyone to have standing to bring
an equal protection challenge, especially in cases where a nonminority challenges governmental affirmative actions programs
designed to protect minorities.
With the next opportunity to rule on this issue, the Supreme
Court should clarify this area of the law once and for all. The
Court can do this by returning to the classical meaning of personal
stake so that a plaintiff must show an actual injury, and not only
that he was ready and able to perform, which is too conjectural.
Although this will result in fewer equal protection challenges
brought in federal courts, the cases which satisfy the standing requirement to find their way into the courts will yield law of a better quality. These precedents will be of more use to future petiinstitution to accomplish the majoritarian task of diverting societal resources away from racial minorities in a manner that benefits the majority. The Court can announce legal prohibitions on discrimination and
enforce them against the other branches of government in a way that
suggests a societal commitment to racial equality, but in the process of

so doing, the Court can allocate resources in a way that overrides the
very equality that its opinions pronounce.
Id.
164. See id. at 1453 (stating that the Court upholds standing when "the
plaintiff challenges a systemic practice that adversely affects the interests of
the white majority, such as an affirmative action program").
165. See id. (stating that the Court denies standing when "the plaintiff challenges a practice that adversely affects the interests of racial minorities, such
as a pattern of restrictive zoning, tax subsidization, or police misconduct").
166. See generally id. at 1454 (discussing the discriminatory results of the
Court's application of standing law in equal protection cases). Professor
Spann explains that the Supreme Court is virtually immune to any challenges

against its own discriminatory practices. Id. He elaborates on this conclusion,

stating: "As a practical matter, of course, neither statutory nor constitutional
prohibitions on racial discrimination apply to the Supreme Court. Realistically, there is no governmental body that possesses the institutional power to

enforce the Constitution against the Court." Id.
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tioners challenging affirmative action programs, because the
precedents set by those cases will be clear.
If the Court refuses to apply the classical standing requirements to equal protection challenges, the Court can, in the alternative, expressly state that the standing requirement in equal protection cases will be the "ready and able" standard, whereas the
standing requirement in other cases will adhere to the Baker personal stake requirement. Although a less favorable alternative,
such a holding by the Court will also serve to guide future plaintiffs when challenging affirmative action programs.
The confusion in the standing doctrine, which has pervaded
the legal system for nearly forty years, needs to be clarified. The
Court should not pass up another opportunity like Gratz to do so.

